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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT LIMITED THE SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION OF 
DETECTIVE HANSEN TO MATTERS RELATING NOT ONLY TO CODEFENDANTf 
BUT TO DEFENDANT AS WELL. 
The State argues that the trial judge, in limiting the scope 
of cross-examination of Detective Hansen on the redacted statement, 
merely restricted defendant from questioning the detective as to 
matters related to the codefendant. The State would therefore have 
this Court believe that defendant was free to question Detective 
Hansen as to all matters relevant to his direct testimony and 
related to the defendant. (See State's Brief at 16, 23) This is 
untrue. 
Defendant was denied the opportunity to ask Detective Hansen 
if the statement is a complete representation of what the defendant 
had told him. (R. at 1390 line 2 to 1397 line 25) Defendant 
should also have been allowed to ask such questions as: Did 
defendant say that he was the one who shot the victim? Did 
defendant say he willingly retrieved more bullets? Did he say that 
somebody had pointed the gun at him and made him drag the body? 
1 
Such questions have nothing to do with the codefendant, yet are 
very relevant to the defendant. Such questions would certainly 
fall within the scope of the detective's direct testimony; yet, in 
an effort to protect the codefendant's constitutional rights, 
questions such as these were not allowed. This Court should bear 
in mind that the redacted statement as testified to by Detective 
Hansen was not a transcript of a recorded statement defendant gave; 
it was merely the detective's recollection of it as he put it in 
his report either the night of the conversation or the next day. 
He neither recorded the conversation nor did he take notes. He 
also admitted that his report could contain inaccuracies. (T. at 
775 line 3-16; 776 line 5-11) The trial court abused its 
discretion in restricting the cross-examination of Detective 
Hansen. 
II. EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE COULD BE FOUND IN BOTH THE UNREDACTED 
STATEMENT AND IN PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE HANSEN. 
The State argues that the unredacted statement was not 
exculpatory in any way. This essentially goes to the argument 
that, even if the trial court erred in restricting cross-
examination of this witness, the defendant was not prejudiced 
thereby. In other words, while there may have been an error, it 
was not prejudicial. 
The State has framed the issue as follows: If there had been 
separate trials, is there a reasonable likelihood that defendant 
would have been acquitted? (State's Brief at 2) However, this 
Court has stated that !l[f]or federal constitutional error to be 
held harmless, we must "sincerely believe that it was harmless 
2 
beyond a reasonable doubt. f ff State v. Dahlquist, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 
35, 37 (January 24, 1997)(Emphasis original)(Citations omitted). 
Therefore, as in Dahlquist, this Court should only confirm the 
defendants conviction if it "can honestly say, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that [defendant] would still have been convicted of murder 
even if the trial court had" ordered separate trials, allowed 
defendant's unredacted statement to be admitted, and allowed free 
cross-examination of Detective Hansen. Id. 
This Court further stated: 
It is not enough that we would find sufficient evidence 
to support the conviction even if [the errors had not 
been committed] . It is inconsequential that a retrial 
will most likely result in a conviction. "Beyond a 
reasonable doubtf requires the highest level of 
certainty known to our legal system . . . . Id. 
(Citations omitted). 
That!s a high burden to meet. Letf s briefly examine what we know 
the jury would have heard if the statement had been unredacted: 
- the victim had inquired about buying a gun from the 
codefendant 
- the codefendant had the gun 
- the codefendant began shooting without any warning 
- the codefendant did all of the shooting 
- the codefendant told defendant to move the body. 
(See the unredacted statement, contained in the parties1 
Stipulation). 
We should examine the foregoing in light of other evidence 
which the jury did hear: 
- the codefendant received a telephone call informing him that 
1 
the victim was a "rat" (R. at 1660 line 14-19; 1685 line 23 to 1686 
line 2) 
- there was a $10,000 "hit" out on the victim and that the 
victim "was trying to set up a deal with [the codefendant] to get 
him busted" (R. at 1663 line 14-22; 1686 line 18 to 1687 line 5) 
- it was the codefendant who shot the victim (R. at 1661 line 
7-12; 1692 line 4-7; 1721 line 24) 
- at the time the victim was shot, the defendant was scared 
("I woke up having the nightmare about Troy's death. How I was 
sitting there discussing if he wanted to buy the gun how he would 
pay for it. I bet I still have skid marks in my pants that I was 
wearing." R. at 1764; State's Exhibit 37A) 
- after he was arrested, the codefendant resided in the Weber 
County jail (T. 786 line 11 to 787 line 6) 
- upon arrest, defendant was taken to the same jail 
- Detective Hansen testified that defendant was scared to go 
to that jail, and that he suspected he knew the reason why 
defendant was scared. (R. at 1421 line 17-21) (Could it be that 
defendant had at least intimated, in his April 14 statement to 
Detective Hansen, that he had been forced to participate?) 
the codefendant threatened to kill defendant because 
defendant "spilled his guts and told everything he knew" about the 
murder (R. at 1687 line 8 to 1688 line 3) 
If the jury had been given the unredacted statement, and heard 
the unrestricted cross-examination testimony of Detective Hansen, 
can this Court be certain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury 
4 
would have convicted defendant anyway? Again, as this Court stated 
in Dahlquist, the likelihood of conviction is irrelevant--it must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that conviction would have been the 
result. 
Secondly, if defendant had been allowed the opportunity to 
cross-examine Detective Hansen concerning the statement defendant 
made to him on April 14, 1994, there may have been exculpatory 
evidence forthcoming. Detective Hansen knew the defendant was 
scared to go to the Weber County Jail, and testimony established 
that the codefendant resided at that jail at that time. Had the 
defendant been afforded the opportunity for effective cross-
examination of the Detective, these things would likely have been 
revealed more clearly for the jury, and very possibly would have 
resulted in an acquittal or a conviction on a lesser charge. 
While few of defendant's statements are found in the record, 
no doubt reference was made to them on the record. Counsel for 
codefendant stated, concerning defendant's statements: 
I figure we have 14 statements that this defendant has 
made. The first one goes from I wasn't there, but I 
think Brandon did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled 
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and made me drag 
the body. He pointed the gun at me and made me load it 
again so we could pump more bullets into the body. 
That's what the statements are. That is clearly a 
situation where we have a co-defendant pointing the 
finger at Mr. Dahlquist and saying he did it, he made me 
do it, and Mr. Dahlquist's only defense is that I was 
not there {R. at 515 line 13 to 516 line 8) (Emphasis 
added). 
• * * 
. . . It is clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do 
it and you pointed a gun at me. That's what Mr. 
Telford's defense will be (R. at 517 line 12-15). 
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Clearly, defendant had made statements that led to counsel's 
statements above. Incidentally, counsel for the codefendant was 
never challenged on these factual statements he made. The State 
would have this Court examine the April 14 statement in isolation 
for any exculpatory elements. Proper cross-examination of 
Detective Hansen may well have revealed that defendant made such 
statements to him. 
The redaction of the statement and restriction on cross 
examination prohibited defendant from not only getting in the 
remainder of the statement, which explicitly states that defendant 
did not kill the victim, but also the cross-examination of 
Detective Hansen might have revealed that defendant had said other 
things which Detective Hansen did not write down, but into which 
defendant was not allowed to inquire. The detective did admit that 
there could be errors in his report. This, in effect, put the 
defendant in a position where, in order to explain the 
discrepancies, he would have to take the stand and subject himself 
to cross-examination, something which he had a right not to do. 
The trial court's rulings violated the defendant's right to due 
process and a fair trial. 
III. THE EVIDENCE DOESN'T SUPPORT THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S INTENTIONS. 
The State argues that there is ample evidence that defendant 
intentionally aided the codefendant in committing the murder, and 
is therefore guilty as an accomplice. 
£ 
Both defendants picked up the victim and drove him to the 
murder scene. 
This would show intention to aid in murder only if the 
"accomplice" knows at that time that in fact a murder is going to 
take place. The evidence only showed that defendant was merely a 
passenger in the vehicle. 
The defendant stood by as codefendant fired a clip of bullets 
into the victim. 
The defendant went to the truck and got more ammunition 
instead of escaping or leaving to summon help. 
What was the defendant supposed to do? There is no evidence 
he had a gun of his own, the nearest home was a mile and a half 
away (R. at 1072 line 19-23), and there is no evidence he had a 
key to the vehicle. Also, the codefendant had been experiencing 
problems with his vehicle earlier (R. at 1448 line 4 to 1449 line 
5; 1450 line 14 to 1451 line 12), and there was no guarantee, even 
if defendant had access to the key, that he could have gotten away 
safely. 
Moreover, the codefendant had the gun. Though the gun had 
jammed, defendant was not in a position to know whether the gun 
could or would come "unjammed," and if it did come "unjammed" 
during an attempt to flee, defendant may have found himself in the 
same condition as the victim. Also, the defendant was very scared, 
the shooting happened very quickly, and the defendant would not 
have been thinking as clearly (or had the opportunity to) as those 
who later argue and analyze the case. 
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Shells matching those at the murder scene were found in 
defendant's vehicle. 
The trial testimony established that the rounds found at the 
scene and on the victim's body were copper coated {or copper 
dipped) . (R. at 1053 line 16 to 1054 line 21) . The medical 
examiner testified that the bullets extracted from the victim's 
body were copper coated. (R. at 1572 line 17 to 1573 line 7) . The 
bullets found in defendant's vehicle were lead end, not copper 
coated. (R. at 1066 line 13 to 1067 line 4) . Testimony also 
established that the type of ammunition found is very common and 
can be found almost anywhere. (R. at 1109 line 17-22) . It is 
noteworthy that the prosecuting attorney did not mention the 
bullets found in defendant's vehicle during his closing argument--
He knew there simply was no connection whatsoever between bullets 
found in the defendant's vehicle and those used to kill the victim. 
The defendant provided ammunition to the codefendant. 
The defendant dragged the victim's body to the ditch. 
Defendant was obviously scared. (I bet I still have skid 
marks in my pants that I was wearing." R. at 1764; State's Exhibit 
37A) The fact that defendant retrieved a clip of ammunition for the 
codefendant or that he moved the body no more evidences an intent 
to help than it does the defendant's fear. Again, while there are 
no direct statements by defendant in the record of participating 
at gunpoint, there is evidence indicating he made such statements. 
(See statements by codefendant's counsel on page 5 herein). 
The defendant destroyed the gun. 
The defendant did not state that he destroyed the gun; he said 
8 
that he would "take the rap for [it].11 (R. at 1763 line 12-13) 
Even if we interpret this statement to mean that he actually 
destroyed the gun, other evidence indicates a continuing fear of 
the codef endant, as well as justification for such fear (Defendant 
was scared to go to the same jail codefendant was being held in; 
codefendant threatened defendant from prison). 
Defendant's subsequent statements show his consciousness of 
guilt. 
The defendant's subsequent statements merely show that he 
wanted to tell people about what happened, but was scared to. The 
State would have this Court believe that defendant wrote a complete 
and exhaustive book about what happened, including every minute 
detail, every thought that went through his mind at every stage. 
That didn't happen. Most defendant's (including this one) are not 
English majors, nor are they great orators--they say and write 
stupid things. This is why defense attorneys frequently advise 
their clients not to make any statements at all. 
Why would the defendant initially lie about being at the 
murder scene? 
This is not a very good question. If the defendant had been 
threatened to not talk, then why would he initially admit that he 
was at the murder scene? He wouldn't. Why did he eventually admit 
it? The codefendant had been arrested and was in jail. The 
defendant could easily have thought it was safe to talk at that 
point, though the codefendant's subsequent threat showed that it 
was not safe to talk. 
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Why wouldn't the defendant say that he had been under duress 
to police? 
It would appear that he did, as evidenced by the following: 
I figure we have 14 statements that this defendant has 
made. The first one goes from I wasn't there, but I 
think Brandon did it, all the way to that Brandon pulled 
the trigger and pointed the gun at me and made me drag 
the body. He pointed the gun at me and made me load it 
again so we could pump more bullets into the body. 
That's what the statements are. That is clearly a 
situation where we have a co-defendant pointing the 
finger at Mr. Dahlquist and saying he did it, he made me 
do it, and Mr. Dahlquist's only defense is that I was 
not there (R. at 515 line 13 to 516 line 8) 
• * * 
. . . It is clear Mr. Telford is saying you made me do 
it and you pointed a gun at me. That's what Mr. 
Telford's defense will be (R. at 517 line 12-15). 
If he were innocent, why would the defendant contemplate death 
rather than face the charges? 
Again, not a very good question. The defendant is a person 
who had been using drugs. Why would a person use drugs? Who 
knows. We can only speculate. Moreover, the State is probably 
taking the statement more literally than was intended. The state's 
attempt at psychoanalysis is laudable, but naive. 
The State argues that defendant's participation in the murder 
didn't begin at the end, that it began with the motive he shared 
to do something to the victim because he was selling diluted drugs. 
(State's Br. ata 28). There was no evidence, however, even 
remotely alluded to by the prosecuting attorney, that the victim 
had sold drugs (diluted or otherwise) during the time between the 
beating and his death. (It is important to remember that the 
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beating occurred because the victim had been selling diluted 
drugs). 
There was no evidence to support the argument that the motive 
for murder was the victim selling diluted drugs, or that it was a 
shared motive. The only motive supported by any evidence was the 
phone call to the codefendant, and there was no evidence that that 
had anything to do with the defendant: there was no evidence that 
he was present during the phone call, there was no evidence the 
codefendant told him about the phone call, and the substance of the 
call related solely to the codefendant (setting up a deal to get 
him busted) , not to the defendant. The prosecutor may have argued 
the shared motive, but there was no evidence to support it. 
Defendant's actions to go back to the truck and get more 
bullets do not reveal a shared intent to kill. There was no 
evidence that defendant had a gun himself, and if he was in fact 
ordered to do so, as inferred by the statements of codefendantfs 
counsel, then defendant's actions show not an intent to kill, but 
an intent to save himself from someone who had just proven that he 
was very willing and capable of following through with his threats. 
The jury made its decision based on the evidence presented 
before it. However, what decision would it have made if the 
evidence had been presented differently? The State is required to 
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the decision would be the 
same, and that simply can't be done. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that when a trial court's 
error amounts to a violation of a defendant's right of 
11 
confrontation, reversal is required unless the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419 (Utah 
1995) . This court stated in State v. Dahlquist that " [f]or federal 
constitutional error to be held harmless, we must ""sincerely 
believe that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Dahlquist 
at 37. There was a reasonable likelihood that, had the trials been 
held separately, defendant Telford would have been acquitted of the 
charge. The error in this case was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT WAS ON NOTICE THAT THE DEFENDANTS1 DEFENSES 
WERE ANTAGONISTIC. 
The State complains that "the arguments from trial that 
defendant cites in his brief are codefendant's arguments about how 
he could be prejudiced from a joint trial with defendant, not the 
other way around." (See State Br. at 26). First, the arguments 
cited to were not from the trial, but from a hearing held on 
September 19, 1994. {See Appellant Br. at 24-25). The intent 
behind including those arguments was to show that the trial court 
was in fact on notice that there was a problem with trying the 
cases together. It is true that counsel for defendant did not 
argue for severance at that time, nor did he argue prejudice to 
defendant. However, it is important to bear in mind that as of 
that time there had been no mention whatsoever that defendant's 
statements would be redacted and that he wouldn't be allowed to 
properly cross-examine the witnesses testifying as to them. Those 
rulings didn't occur until the time of trial (the ruling to redact 
the statement was given on March 28, 1995, approximately one week 
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before trial (R. at 546 line 11-15)) . The arguments were included 
in defendant's brief merely to counter any notion that the trial 
court was not apprised of the antagonistic nature of the 
defendants1 defenses, and of the problems of trying the two 
defendants together. 
V. DEFENDANT DIDN'T TESTIFY BECAUSE HE HAD A RIGHT NOT TO 
INCRIMINATE HIMSELF, YET ALSO HAD A RIGHT TO RELY ON 
STATEMENTS HE'D GIVEN AND PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE 
OFFICERS. 
The State has argued that defendant's right against self-
incrimination was not violated because he in fact did not testify 
at trial. This argument entirely misses the point. Defendant had 
a right to present testimony through statements he'd given the 
police. Defendant also had a right to properly cross-examine any 
officers who testified regarding his statements. The defendant 
also had a due process right not to have the jury misled by 
incomplete statements. 
If defendant had testified, he would then have subjected 
himself to cross-examination, something he had a right not to do. 
It was and is the defendant's position that by not testifying, he 
preserves the issue for appeal of having been prejudiced by having 
a joint trial, having his statement redacted, and being restricted 
on cross-examination of the officer regarding defendant's 
statement. In short, in a separate trial the defendant would not 
have been fettered by the competing constitutional rights of the 
codefendant. He would also have been unfettered by the competing 
and antagonistic defense of the codefendant. The jury would not 
have been forced to choose between two versions of an event. The 
13. 
defendant, in a separate trial, could have presented his defense 
to the jury and have it make a decision based on all the evidence, 
not incomplete statements and lies presented as truth. 
Conclusion 
The court erred by refusing to sever the trials of the 
defendants. Their defenses were irreconcilably antagonistic and 
it was prejudicial to try the defendants jointly. The trial court 
also erred by admitting the redacted statement testified to by 
Detective Hansen, and by limiting cross-examination concerning the 
statement. This Court should reverse the conviction and remand 
this case for a new trial, separate from the codefendant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / $ day of March 1997. 
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MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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